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REWRITING JUDICIAL RECUSAL RULES WITH BIG DATA 
 
Raymond J. McKoski* 
 
Abstract 
Big data affects the personal and professional life of every judge. A 
judge’s travel time to work, creditworthiness, and chances of an IRS audit 
all depend on predictive algorithms interpreting big data. A client’s choice 
of counsel, the precise wording of a litigant’s motion, and the composition 
of the jury may be dictated by analytics. Touted as a means of bringing 
objectivity to judicial decision-making, judges have employed big data to 
determine sentences and to set the amount of restitution in class action 
cases. Unfortunately, the legal profession and big data proponents have 
ignored one perplexing problem begging for a big data solution—the 
arbitrary and inconsistent manner in which courts determine judicial 
recusal issues. 
Every jurisdiction disqualifies a judge when the fully-informed, 
reasonable, lay observer concludes that the judge’s “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.” Created by the American Bar Association in 
1972 to bring uniformity and consistency to the disqualification process, 
this “objective” test has been a dismal failure. The ABA’s goal, however, 
can be realized by infusing data analytics into the disqualification 
decision-making process. 
Part I of this Article identifies the serious shortcomings of an 
appearance-based disqualification standard. Part II explains how 
analysis of big data can correct the theoretical and practical problems 
plaguing the “might reasonably be questioned” standard. Part III applies 
the big data derived model to one type of disqualification motion—motions 
seeking a judge’s removal from a case because of contributions made to 
the judge’s election campaign by litigants, lawyers, or others connected 




Big data influences the personal and professional life of every judge.1 As like 
any other person, a judge may benefit from medical technology’s use of big data to 
                                                   
* © 2020 Raymond J. McKoski. Circuit Judge (retired), Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 
Lake County, Illinois. Judge McKoski is an Adjunct Professor at the UIC John Marshall Law 
School, Chicago, Illinois. 
1 See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use 
of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 10 (2018) (“Big Data is not a futuristic phenomenon. 
It is already in widespread use, pervading all aspects of our daily lives.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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create a patient-specific vaccine for the judge or a member of the judge’s family.2 
The judge’s creditworthiness,3 travel time to work,4 and the likelihood of an Internal 
Revenue Service audit5 depend on predictive algorithms interpreting big data. Big 
data enhances a judge’s enjoyment of sporting events because analytics is 
“revolutionizing” all major sports “from player recruitment to fan engagement.”6 If 
a judge cannot find one of the 15,000 broadcast radio stations in the United States 
to her liking,7 data analysis allows the judge “to have [her] own, personal radio 
stations.”8  
In the exercise of adjudicative responsibilities, a judge knows that law 
enforcement departments rely on technology to predict where crimes will occur and 
to identify likely victims and perpetrators.9 Soon, big data may establish reasonable 
suspicion to support the temporary detention of a suspect under the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1968 ruling in Terry v. Ohio.10  
                                                   
2 See Chloé Margulis, The Application of Big Data Analytics to Patent Litigation, 99 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 305, 317–18 (2017). 
3 See Komal S. Patel, Note, Testing the Limits of the First Amendment: How Online 
Civil Rights Testing Is Protected Speech Activity, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1481 (2018). 
4 See Andrew Kasabian, Note, Litigating in the 21st Century: Amending Challenges for 
Cause in Light of Big Data, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 173, 191 (2015) (“A final industry where Big 
Data has made an impact is traffic management and control.”). 
5 See Kimberly A. Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: 
What Tax Practitioners Need to Know, 128 J. TAX’N 6, 6 (2018). 
6 Ryan Ayers, How Big Data Is Revolutionizing Sports, DATACONOMY (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://dataconomy.com/2018/01/big-data-revolutionizing-favorite-sports-teams [https:// 
perma.cc/P7B8-MY6Q]; see also Brian Burke, 4th Down Study, ADVANCED FOOTBALL 
ANALYTICS, (Nov. 12, 2004), http://www.advancedfootballanalytics.com/index.php/home/ 
research/game-strategy/120-4th-down-study [https://perma.cc/LH9H-67ZZ] (using big data 
to analyze decisions made on fourth downs); Bernard Marr, The Big Risks of Big Data in 
Sports, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/04/28/the-
big-risks-of-big-data-in-sports/#6926d6757c6f [https://perma.cc/7UGQ-Q8LF] (discussing 
pitfalls of big data’s use in sports). 
7 See FCC, BROADCAST STATION TOTALS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2018 (FCC News, Oct. 
3, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-354386A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4 
AS-L5JQ].  
8 How Does Big Data Impact Your Life?, BOTANANALYTICS BLOG (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://botanalytics.co/blog/2017/08/04/big-data-impact-life/ [https://perma.cc/QXC8-
ZPNT].  
9 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1109, 1113 (2017) (“Data from past crimes, including crime types and locations, are fed into 
a computer algorithm to identify targeted city blocks with a daily (and sometimes hourly) 
forecast of crime. . . . In large cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and New Orleans, 
complex social network analysis has isolated likely perpetrators and victims of gun 
violence.”). 
10 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits brief 
investigative detentions by law enforcement officers who possess “specific and articulable 
facts” short of probable cause, that create a likelihood “that criminal activity may be afoot”); 
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But law enforcement’s use of big data and algorithms to bring alleged offenders 
into court is only one way in which predictive analytics will affect the administration 
of justice. Prosecutors already present adjudicators with the results of 
algorithmically generated recidivism predictions as an aid in bail, parole, and 
sentencing decisions.11 Litigants may choose their lawyers through dataset analysis 
that compares overall lawyer success rates, lawyer success rates before individual 
judges, and even lawyer success rates before individual judges in specific types of 
litigation.12 Big data can dictate case processing and outcomes by providing clients 
with the “universe of options others have taken in similar situations and to forecast 
the probability that a particular course of action would be favorable to the client.”13 
The vast amount of personalized electronic information makes jury selection ripe 
for predictive software.14 And courts have employed algorithms to set restitution 
amounts in class action cases. 15 
                                                   
see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1989) (comparing Terry’s “reasonable 
suspicion” standard with the probable cause standard); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data 
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 386 (2015) (describing how 
“big data tools exist to generate the necessary reasonable suspicion” required by Terry v. 
Ohio). 
11 See MEGAN T. STEVENSON & JENNIFER L. DOLEAC, THE ROADBLOCK TO REFORM 1, 
3 (Am. Const. Soc’y, Nov. 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ 
RoadblockToReformReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5JG-WU6U] (stating that algorithmic 
risk assessment tools are used at sentencing in “at least twenty-eight full states; at least seven 
additional states have at least one county that uses risk assessment tools at sentencing”); see 
also Ferguson, supra note 9, at 1120–21) (discussing the use of actuarial predictions in bail, 
sentencing, and parole decisions); Ric Simmons, Big Data and Procedural Justice: 
Legitimizing Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 
(2018) (discussing debate over the use of big data in pre-arrest monitoring, bail, and 
sentencing); Jason Tashea, Risk-assessment algorithms challenged in bail, sentencing and 
parole decisions, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_camp
aign=weekly_email [https://perma.cc/NPM7-H47T] (describing the debate over “the use of 
algorithms in bail, sentencing and parole decisions”). 
12 See Kasabian, supra note 4, at 206 (stating that data analytics can “help clients 
identify the attorneys that win before certain judges on certain types of cases.”); Margulis, 
supra note 2, at 318 (“Big data is currently implemented to compare competing law firms” 
and to “predict[] and compare[] lawyer success rates.”). 
13 Caryn Devins et al., The Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 357, 
367 (2017). 
14 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935, 937 
(2016) (“The rise of ‘big data’ has the potential to upend the current informational limitations 
of jury selection.”); see also VOLTAIRE, TOUR, https://voltaireapp.com/tour 
[https://perma.cc/S5V7-V8LD] (last visited Sept. 17, 2019) (offering to combine “powerful 
artificial intelligence,” patent pending algorithms, and access to more than a billion data 
points to identify “hidden risks and potential biases” of jurors). 
15 See, e.g., Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 
2015) (noting that algorithms may also be used to calculate restitution). 
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The explosion of scholarly work and proliferation of private and publicly 
sponsored research into the use of big data in the administration of justice has 
ignored one problem that begs for a big data solution—the “crumbling” framework 
of judicial disqualification.16 Of course, some disqualification decisions are easy. 
For example, the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
requires a judge’s disqualification in any matter in which the judge’s relative within 
the third degree of relationship appears as a lawyer, witness, or litigant.17 Judges 
effortlessly comply with such specific disqualification standards because they know 
their relatives. But in addition to a list of specific disqualifying factors, every 
jurisdiction requires disqualification “in any proceeding in which the judge’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”18 This catch-all standard is one of the 
most frequently invoked provisions of judicial codes and the primary 
disqualification standard.19 Because the “might reasonably be questioned” standard 
is “troublesomely vague,”20 “frighteningly empty of content,”21 and “unworkable,”22 
the standard has failed to accomplish its drafters’ objectives. It has not brought 
                                                   
16 Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again, 30 REV. LITIG. 
671, 675 (2011) (“I argue that the dominant regime that has structured judicial 
disqualification in the state and federal courts for nearly forty years . . . is crumbling, and the 
struggle for a successor regime has begun.”). 
17 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); see also id. at 
Terminology (defining “Third degree of relationship” to include “the following persons: 
great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-
grandchild, nephew, and niece.”). 
18 Id. at r. 2.11(A); see also Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their 
Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 411, 416 n.29 (2014) (explaining that every jurisdiction has adopted this standard).  
19 See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s 
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000) 
(describing the “might reasonably be questioned” test as “[o]ne of the most frequently 
invoked standards in the [judicial] Codes”); Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of 
Lawyer Disqualification, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71, 155 n.356 (2014) (describing the 
“might reasonably be questioned” test as “[t]he primary disqualification standard for 
judges”). 
20 John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 59-60 (1970); see also Leslie W. Abramson, What Every Judge Should 
Know About the Appearance of Impartiality, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2016) (“[T]he 
ABA’s 1972 general principle for judicial disqualification endures despite its intrinsic 
vagueness.”). 
21 Judicial Disqualification: Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 39 (1971, 
1973) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John P. Frank).  
22 Haynes v. State, 937 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); see also Burgess v. 
State, 342 S.W.3d 325, 328 n.5 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (“The Court in Haynes found the ‘might 
reasonably be questioned’ standard unworkable. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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consistency and uniformity to recusal decisions,23 made recusal decisions objective 
rather than subjective, or increased public confidence in the judiciary.24 
Many shortcomings infect the catch-all category of recusal. First, the drafters 
of the “might reasonably be questioned” language provided judges with little help 
in interpreting or applying the elusive test.25 Second, rather than filling that void, 
courts have specifically advised judges not to rely on case precedent when deciding 
whether to remove themselves from cases.26 Third, judicial ethics advisory 
committees—created to assist judges in complying with ethical mandates—have 
largely abdicated on the issue.27 Fourth, the test pretends to be an “objective test” 
because the ordinary, reasonable, lay observer, and not the judge, is assigned to 
decide whether a set of circumstances creates an appearance of partiality.28 It is no 
coincidence, however, that the lay arbiter of judicial disqualification is imbued with 
precisely the same knowledge as the challenged judge. That knowledge includes 
facts unknown to the general public, all facets of substantive and procedural law, the 
judge’s past judicial performance, the practicalities and realities of practicing law, 
and a complete mastery of the code of judicial conduct.29 The level of imputed 
knowledge attributed to the reasonable person raises the suspicion that the fictitious 
arbiter is, in reality, the challenged judge. This suspicion is confirmed by the fact 
that challenged judges usually decide their own disqualification motions, thus 
simultaneously serving as the interpreter and object of the “might reasonably be 
questioned” standard. The result is an objective test in theory and a subjective test 
in practice.30  
These and other failings have led researchers to conclude that “judicial 
disqualification frequently is subjective, random, and arbitrary” and that the 
appearance of partiality test in particular “pose[s] a special dilemma.”31 Professor 
Charles Geyh put it this way: “The net effect is that except in extreme or well-settled 
cases, consensus on when it is fair or reasonable to doubt the impartiality of a judge 
is elusive—we do not know it when we see it.”32 
                                                   
23 This Article uses the terms “recusal” and “disqualification” interchangeably. Cf. In 
re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 769 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that courts 
commonly use the terms “recusal” and “disqualification” interchangeably). 
24 See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
25 See McKoski, supra note 18, at 434–38. 
26 See infra Section I.B.1. 
27 Id. 
28 See infra Section I.B.2. 
29 See infra Section I.B.2.a. 
30 RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION 
OF JUDGES § 5.1 (2d ed. 2007). 
31 JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 4–5 (Am. Judicature Soc’y, 
1995). 
32 Geyh, supra note 16, at 676. 
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Further signaling the profession’s disappointment with the “might reasonably 
be questioned” standard, the literature is replete with suggested reforms to improve 
the objectivity and consistency of disqualification decisions.33 The recommended 
modifications include directing that independent judges hear recusal motions, 
requiring judges to provide written disqualification decisions, the preemptory 
disqualification of trial judges, and the use of lay panels to decide recusal issues.34 
Even if states were anxious to adopt such reforms, the reforms do not address the 
fundamental theoretical flaw in the appearance-based disqualification regime. The 
“reasonable observer” as presently constructed is simply “hopelessly outmoded.”35  
This Article proposes that permitting big data36 to control, or at least inform, 
disqualification decisions will significantly reduce the theoretical and practical 
deficiencies of appearance-based recusal. By removing the judge from the equation 
and enhancing the objective information possessed by the fictitious reasonable 
person, the ultimate goal of uniform, consistent, and predictable disqualification 
decisions can be achieved. Part I examines the undeniable defects of appearance-
based disqualification. Part I also briefly reviews recurring recommendations for 
reforming the judicial disqualification process. Part II describes how the use of big 
data would transform the “might reasonably be questioned” test into what its 
architects intended. Part III illustrates how big data can cure shortcomings in 
appearance-based disqualification by applying the big data model to one type of 
disqualification motion—motions seeking a judge’s removal from a case based on 
contributions made to the judge’s election campaign by litigants, lawyers, or others 
connected with the litigation. The devastating impact that campaign contributions 
can have on the perceived fairness of the judiciary and the sheer volume of untapped, 
                                                   
33 See infra Section I.C. 
34 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial 
Disqualification—And a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better 
Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 
REV. LITIG. 733, 788–805 (2011) (collecting suggested reforms). 
35 Id. at 809. 
36 Some commentators might describe the proposal outlined in this Article as 
employing “analytics” rather than “big data” because the relevant data sets may not satisfy 
the “volume, velocity, and variety” requirement usually associated with big data. See Jason 
Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2017). And in some 
applications of the proposal, the “three Vs” might not meet the evolving and “squishy” 
definitions of big data. See Paul Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 339, 340 (2013). But today, the term “‘big data’ has become nearly synonymous 
with ‘data analysis,’” id., and is used here to describe “a way of thinking about knowledge 
through data and a framework for supporting decision making. . . .” Sofia Grafanaki, 
Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 803, 805 (2017) (quoting Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run 
Around Anonymity and Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: 
FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 44, 46 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014)); see also Michael 
Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 539 (2014) (“The term, ‘big data,’ 
refers to a new method of empirical inquiry.”). 
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public information relevant to whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned because of financial assistance provided to a judge’s election effort, 
make this issue the perfect test for big data’s ability to correct the defects in 
appearance-based disqualification. 
 
I.  APPEARANCE-BASED JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: ORIGINS AND FAILED 
REFORM EFFORTS 
 
In 1972, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a new judicial 
disqualification regime mandating disqualification whenever the lay observer might 
reasonably question a judge’s impartiality.37 Suffering from serious deficiencies in 
a theoretical framework and practical application, this ambiguous disqualification 
test never had a chance to succeed. Patch-work attempts to revise the standard have 
failed to address the inherent flaws in appearance-based recusal. 
 
A.  The ABA’s Transition to Appearance-Based Disqualification 
 
Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, the legal profession embraced 
the long-standing value of actual judicial impartiality as the cornerstone of the 
American legal system.38 The common law presumed that every judge possessed 
this “indispensable feature of democracy.”39 This presumption was irrebuttable, save 
for matters in which a judge had a direct financial interest.40 The common law 
considered “the lure of lucre” such a “particularly strong motivation,”41 that any 
pecuniary interest in a proceeding, no matter how small, automatically disqualified 
                                                   
37 CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972), reprinted in LISA L. 
MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 116 (1992). 
38 See McKoski, supra note 18, at 418. (“But the ‘big bang’ in the expanding universe 
of judicial disqualification came in 1972, when the ABA decided that promoting public 
confidence in judicial impartiality, rather than protecting a litigant’s right to a fair judge, 
supplied the primary rationale for disqualifying judges.”). 
39 Elizabeth B. Wydra, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
Caperton: Placing the Federalism Debate in Historical Context, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 239, 
241 (2010) (“[A] fair and impartial judiciary has been an indispensable feature of 
democracy.”). 
40 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 191, 250 (2012) (“[A]t common law, the presumption of impartiality was 
irrebuttable: judges could not be disqualified for bias.”); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877–79 (2009) (holding that financial interest is sufficient to require 
recusal). 
41 Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? 
Should Judicial Education be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 947 (2002) (“As the common law recognized, and as experience 
teaches, the lure of lucre is a particularly strong motivation, and therefore judges ought to be 
prohibited from presiding over cases in whose outcomes they have a direct financial 
interest.”). 
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the judge.42 The common law recognized no other interest as sufficient to overcome 
a judge’s oath to administer justice impartially.43 In the United States, disqualifying 
factors slowly expanded to include interests other than financial. In 1821, Congress 
amended the federal recusal statute to remove a judge from a case in which the 
judge’s relative was a party.44 In 1911, Congress further amended the statute to 
require recusal when a judge possessed a “personal bias or prejudice” in a matter.45 
During this expansion of the grounds for judicial disqualification, one fact remained 
constant—the determinative issue was a judge’s actual impartiality.46 Frequently, 
courts and commentators also advised against creating an appearance of bias, 
partiality, or evil, but these admonishments were hortatory and directed to all 
participants in the justice system including lawyers, judges, jurors, witnesses, and 
even law professors.47  
                                                   
42 Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 340 (1 Tyng) (1816), stated the rule: 
 
It is very certain, that, by the principles of natural justice, of the common law, and 
of our constitution, no man can lawfully sit as judge in a cause in which he may 
have a pecuniary interest. Nor does it make any difference, that the interest 
appears to be trifling: for the minds of men are so differently affected by the same 
degrees of interest that it has been found impossible to draw a satisfactory line. 
Any interest, therefore, however small, has been held sufficient to render a judge 
incompetent. 
 
(emphasis in original). 
43 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1936) (“As Blackstone put it, 
‘the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to 
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and 
idea.’” (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361)). 
44 Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; see also Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N.Y. 547, 
551 (1850) (“Hence the statute declares, that no judge of any court can sit as such in any 
cause to which he is a party or in which he is interested, or in which he would be disqualified 
from being a juror by reason of consanguinity or affinity to either of the parties.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
45 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090. 
46 See Kevin D. Swan, Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the Face 
of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (1987) (stating that 
“actual impartiality” governed a federal judge’s recusal until 1972 when Congress adopted 
the ABA’s new appearance-based, “might reasonably be questioned” test).  
47 E.g., Ayrhart v. Wilhelmy, 112 N.W. 782, 783 (Iowa 1907) (“[Jurors] should be 
careful not only to avoid actual impropriety, but to keep themselves clear of the very 
appearance of evil. . . .”); In re Duncan, 42 S.E. 433, 441 (S.C. 1902) (“And we hope that 
Mr. Duncan’s unenviable experience in this proceeding will prove a warning, especially to 
the young members of the bar, so to acquit themselves as attorneys at law as to avoid even 
the appearance of evil.”); Paul W. Brosman, The Association Law School and Bar 
Examination Preparation, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 412, 414–15 (1930–1934) (suggesting that 
law professors avoid the appearance of evil); R. Ogden Doremus, Duties of Experts and 
Others in Poison Cases, 1 CRIM. L. MAG. 293, 320 (1880) (instructing expert witnesses how 
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Canon 4 of the first model judicial code adopted by the ABA in 1924 instructed 
judges to aspire to keep their in-court conduct “free from impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety” and their personal lives, “beyond reproach.”48 Canon 4, 
however, did not govern disqualification. That task was assigned to Canons 13 and 
29.49 Canon 13 disqualified a judge when a near relative appeared as a litigant.50 
Canon 29 required recusal when a judge’s direct “personal interests,” usually 
interpreted to mean financial interests, were involved.51 Consistent with the law at 
the time, no Canon dictated or even suggested recusal for the sake of appearances. 
That would change with the ABA’s 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct.52 
The 1972 ABA Code continued to list several circumstances that required the 
automatic disqualification of a judge. Those disqualifying factors included financial 
interests, relationships with lawyers and litigants, prior service as a lawyer in a case, 
actual bias or prejudice, and personal knowledge of controverted adjudicative 
facts.53 But the 1972 ABA Code added a standalone ground for recusal that relied 
on perceptions rather than reality. Canon 3(C)(1) mandated disqualification 
whenever a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”54 Several 
important considerations convalesced to convince the drafters of the 1972 Code to 
adopt an appearance-based disqualification regime. 
First, while the traditional fact-based disqualifying factors like financial and 
family interests were sufficient to protect the litigants’ constitutional due process 
right to an impartial arbiter,55 these disqualifiers did not do enough to enhance public 
confidence in the judiciary.56 To fill that void, the ABA enacted a broad, appearance-
based recusal test that focused on how things looked to the public rather than on the 
parties’ substantive right to a fair and impartial trial and judge. A trial might be fair 
                                                   
to avoid the appearance of evil); Office Duties, 4 AM. L. REG. 193, 200 (1856) (“A lawyer’s 
honor, like a woman’s, must be above all suspicion. He, as well as she, must avoid the very 
appearance of evil.”).  
48 CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924).  
49 Id. at Canons 13, 29.  
50 Id. at Canon 13. 
51 Id. at Canon 29. 
52 CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972). 
53 Id. at Canon 3(C)(1)(a)–(d). 
54 Id. at Canon 3(C)(1). 
55 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution require “due process 
of law” before the government may deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. U.S. CONST. 
amend V, amend. XIV. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as requiring an 
impartial decisionmaker. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
56 See Raymond J. McKoski, Giving Up Appearances: Judicial Disqualification and 
the Apprehension of Bias, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 35, 63 (2015) [hereinafter McKoski, 
Giving Up Appearances] (“[R]ules mandating a judge’s removal for an appearance of bias 
do not protect the parties but instead serve to promote public confidence in judicial 
impartiality. When a judge possessing an actual bias hears a case, the litigants sustain the 
injury. But when a judge suffers from only an appearance of bias the injury is not to the 
parties but to the judicial system.”). 
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in actuality, thereby protecting the parties, but look unfair, thereby damaging public 
trust in the courts. Second, proving actual judicial bias was nearly impossible.57 
Third, the devastating effect of the Watergate scandal58 on public confidence in 
governmental institutions triggered attempts to shore-up faith in the judiciary.59 How 
better to enhance public trust in the judiciary than to disqualify judges when the 
public has “any scintilla of doubt” about a judge’s impartiality.60 Fourth, the legal 
profession was dissatisfied with the subjective test that judges applied in 
determining whether disqualification was necessary.61 For example, prior to its 
amendment in 1974, the federal disqualification statute required recusal when a 
judge was “so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it 
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding 
therein.”62 The subjective standard left disqualification matters “basically committed 
to the judge’s conscience.”63  
                                                   
57 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (noting the difficulty 
in proving actual bias); Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 345 (Tenn. 2011) (observing that as 
a practical matter subjective bias or lack of impartiality may be impossible to prove). 
58 The “Watergate” scandal refers to the events triggered by the arrest of five persons 
attempting to “bug” the Democrat National Committee headquarters in the Watergate Hotel 
in Washington, D.C., for the purpose of giving the Republicans inside information in 
planning election strategy in the 1972 presidential campaign. The break-in to the Watergate, 
the connection between the burglary and President Richard Nixon’s reelection campaign, a 
Supreme Court decision ordering the release of recordings made by President Nixon in the 
Oval Office, and resolutions of impeachment voted by the House Judiciary Committee, led 
to President Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. See HERBERT S. PARMET, RICHARD NIXON 
AND HIS AMERICA 637–38 (1990). 
59 See James J. Alfini et al., Dealing with Judicial Misconduct in the States: Judicial 
Independence, Accountability and Reform, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 889, 908 (2007) (concluding 
that most states adopted the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct “in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal, a time when the press and the public were demanding greater 
accountability from public officials.”). 
60 Hearings, supra note 21, at 14 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining why the 
federal judicial disqualification statute should be amended to require recusal when the 
circumstances create an appearance of partiality). 
61 See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 872 (1988) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that when Congress amended the federal 
disqualification statute in 1974, it “was concerned with the ‘appearance’ of impropriety, and 
to that end changed the previous subjective standard for disqualification to an objective one; 
no longer was disqualification to be decided on the basis of the opinion of the judge in 
question, but by the standard of what a reasonable person would think.”). 
62 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948) (emphasis added). 
63 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1976); MacNeil Bros. Co. v. 
Cohen, 264 F.2d 186, 189 (1st Cir. 1959) (“[W]hether a member of a court of appeals should 
disqualify himself . . . is a matter confided to the conscience of the particular judge.”); see 
also Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[D]isqualification for being ‘so 
related or connected’ is generally ‘a matter confided to the conscience of the particular 
judge.’”) (quoting MacNeil Bros. at 189); Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 
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Convinced that an objective test would make disqualification decisions less 
capricious and arbitrary and so increase public confidence in the judiciary, the ABA 
added the appearance-based test to the 1972 Code.64 The new test, apparently 
derived from Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Continental Casualty,65 
stated, “[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”66 The 1990 and 2007 ABA Model Codes67 
included the “might reasonably be questioned” test and it has been adopted by every 
state and federal jurisdiction.68 
But, as the next section details, the objective disqualification standard adopted 
by the 1972 ABA Code suffers from theoretical and practical problems at least as 
significant as the subjective test it replaced. Big data can help eliminate these 
shortcomings, as discussed in Part II. 
 
B.  Surveying the Inadequacies of Appearance-Based Disqualification 
 
Vagueness impedes any attempt to apply an appearance-based recusal test. 
Courts and administrative bodies readily admit their inability to cabin the “might 
reasonably be questioned” standard or guide judges in interpreting and applying the 
test.69 Compounding the vagueness problem, an “objective” inquiry requires the 
reasonable layperson to assess whether the circumstances warrant a belief that a 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. That ordinary observer, the 
average person on the street, is presumed to know all the facts and law in the case, 
including everything the judge knows, and in some cases, facts unknown to the 
judge.70 And while the reasonable, detached observer must be someone outside the 
judiciary, it is the challenged judge who takes off his robe to examine the issue and 
then puts the robe back on to announce the lay observer’s decision.71 
  
                                                   
903, 907 (7th Cir. 1959) (observing that recusal is an issue “to be determined by the judge 
within his own conscience”). 
64 CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972). 
65 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (“[A]ny tribunal permitted by law to try cases and 
controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.”). 
66 CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972); see also E. WAYNE 
THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 61 (1973). 
67 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990); MODEL 
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
68 See McKoski, supra note 18, at 416 n.29. 
69 See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
70 See infra Section I.B.2.a. 
71 See infra Section I.B.2.b. 
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1.  A Hopelessly Vague Standard 
 
Courts, commentators, and judicial advisory bodies agree that the catch-all 
disqualification standard is “troublesomely vague” and “elusive” in application.72 
Nevertheless, the 1972 Code did not attempt to define the standard or set parameters 
to foster its consistent application.73 This omission is curious because the drafters of 
the 1972 Code were critical of the indefinite disqualification provisions of the 1924 
Canons. The drafting committee for the 1972 Code found the old Canon 13’s 
command to disqualify in cases involving near relatives and Canon 29’s requirement 
to disqualify from cases involving a judge’s personal interests “far from satisfactory 
. . . for their lack of guidance in a specific situation.”74 The drafters’ failure to define 
or refine the new standard in the 1972 Code appears to have resulted from their belief 
that most recusal questions would fall within the four specific conflict-based 
disqualifying circumstances included in Canon 3C(1).75 In fact, Professor Thode 
worried that lawyers and judges would “overlook” the general catch-all standard.76 
The lack of importance attached to the new test was also reflected in Thode’s failure 
to mention the “might reasonably be questioned” language in his list of “highlights 
of the new [1972] ABA Code.”77 The ABA drafting committee did, however, make 
two things very clear. First, the 1972 Code adopted an appearance-based 
disqualification regime by requiring recusal whenever the circumstances created an 
“appearance of bias,” “appearance of impropriety,” or the “appearance of a lack of 
impartiality.”78 Second, the new test was “objective” because the fully-informed, 
reasonable person, not the judge, would determine if the challenged judge’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.79  
Reviewing courts concede that their decisions do not help judges struggling 
over whether disqualification is necessary for a particular matter. In stark 
                                                   
72 Frank, supra note 20, at 59–60 (“troublesomely vague”); Foster v. United States, 618 
A.2d 191, 195 (D.C. 1992) (Reilly, J., dissenting) (describing the standard as “somewhat 
elusive”). 
73 See MILORD, supra note 37, at 116–17; see also SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 
F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977) (observing that “no factual or concrete examples of the 
appearance of impartiality were provided in the Congressional debates” concerning the 
adoption of this standard). 
74 THODE, supra note 66, at 60, 63 (“[O]ld canon 29 prescribes a disqualification for 
‘personal interest,’ but gives no help to a judge in defining which interests are 
disqualifying.”). 
75 Id. at 60.  
76 Id. 
77 E. Wayne Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 793, 797–803 (1972). Similarly, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., in his 1971 article 
summarizing the ongoing work of the ABA committee, failed to mention the appearance-
based standard while discussing conflict-based disqualification rules. Robert A. Ainsworth, 
Judicial Ethics—A Crisis Abates, 45 TULANE L. REV. 245, 257–58 (1971). 
78 THODE, supra note 66, at 60–61.  
79 Id. at 60. 
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admissions, courts advise judges of the futility of consulting disqualification 
jurisprudence when deciding whether to remain on a case. The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, for instance, advises judges that because recusal decisions turn on 
factual subtleties, “the analysis of a particular [disqualification issue] must be 
guided, not by comparison to similar situations addressed by prior jurisprudence, but 
rather by an independent examination of the unique facts and circumstances of the 
particular claim at issue.”80 And while disappointing, the failure of courts to provide 
guidance on disqualification issues is understandable because no circumstance is 
immune from a claim of apparent partiality. For example, Comment 4 to Rule 2.11 
of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge is not 
disqualified because a lawyer appearing before the judge is a member of a firm that 
employs a relative of the judge.81 But Comment 4 hastens to add that recusal is 
necessary if the appearance of the member of the relative’s firm might cause the 
judge’s impartiality to be reasonably questioned.82 Just as unhelpful, under Rule 
2.11, a judge who previously served as a lawyer for a governmental agency is 
disqualified from cases involving the agency only if the judge “personally and 
substantially” participated in the case — unless, of course, a lesser degree of 
involvement creates an appearance of impropriety.83  
Judicial ethics advisory committees have also failed to help judges interpret and 
apply the “might reasonably be questioned” disqualification test. For example, the 
New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics provided no guidance when it 
tried to establish a rule governing a judge’s disqualification due to a personal or 
social relationship with an attorney appearing before the judge. The New York 
Advisory Committee declared the black letter rule that mere acquaintanceships 
between lawyers and judges do not require recusal, unless, of course, an 
acquaintanceship creates an appearance of impropriety.84 In other words, an 
acquaintanceship does not require disqualification unless the facts could reasonably 
cause the reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. This circular 
reasoning does not help judges. The ethics advisory committee for federal judges 
fared no better than the New York Committee when it advised a judge considering  
                                                   
80 United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States 
v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Swallers, 897 F.3d 
875, 877 (7th Cir. 2018); In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 895 (11th Cir. 2014); Nicholas v. Alley, 
71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995); State v. Shelton, 901 N.W.2d 741, 745–46 (S.D. 2017); 
Griffen v. Dan Kemp, No. 4:17CV00639 JM, 2018 WL 387810, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 11, 
2018). 
81 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. r. 2.11A(6)(b). 
84 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 11-125 (2011). 
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whether to recuse from a case in which the godfather of the judge’s child appeared, 
that “ultimately, the question of disqualification is one that only the judge may 
answer.”85 
 
2.  The Ordinary Reasonable Person 
 
Vagueness is not the only problematic aspect of the phrase, “might reasonably 
be questioned.” To be considered an “objective” test, a layperson, not a judge, must 
determine whether a judge should be removed from a case. In the United States, this 
ubiquitous, hypothetical observer is the “average person on the street.”86 Relying on 
the disinterested lay observer brings the public into the courtroom87 to apply 
accepted societal norms in many areas of public and private jurisprudence.88 
Unquestionably, the reasonable person has faithfully fulfilled their duty—at least 
where a societal consensus exists—about the applicable standard. Thus, for instance, 
the reasonable person easily concludes that the driver of an automobile violates 
society’s accepted standard by proceeding through a red light. Similarly, a court 
examining a contract may safely conclude, “a reasonable person would agree that a 
potential income loss of $584,000 a year is an important economic interest,”89 and 
                                                   
85 U.S. Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Formal Op. 11 (2009); see also Fla. Jud. Ethics 
Advisory Comm., Op. 98-29 (1998) (advising a judge that the disqualification decision 
“would be up to the individual judge to decide whether recusal would be necessary”). 
86 United States v. Robinson, 809 F.3d 991, 998 (8th Cir. 2016); Potashnick v. Port City 
Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] judge faced with a potential ground 
for disqualification ought to consider how his participation in a given case looks to the 
average person on the street.”); Woods v. United States, No. 1:17CV00047 SNLJ, 2018 WL 
4333565, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 11, 2018) (citing Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (“The operative issue is whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned by the average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of a case.”)); 
see also Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative 
Perceptive, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2010) (“[L]ooking at the reasonable 
person across his many appearances makes at least one thing clear—he is most often the 
common or ordinary man.”). 
87 McKoski, Giving Up Appearances, supra note 56, at 53 (“The whole idea of 
employing the reasonable person standard in judicial ethics is to “bring the public into the 
room.” (quoting Lori Ann Foertsch, Scalia’s Duck Hunt Leads to Ruffled Feathers: How the 
U.S. Supreme Court and Other Federal Judiciaries Should Change Their Recusal Approach, 
43 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 466 (2006))).  
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that 
the reasonable man determines negligence by employing “a standard of conduct demanded 
by the community”); Ashley M. Votruba, Will the Real Reasonable Person Please Stand 
Up? Using Psychology to Better Understand How Juries Interpret and Apply the Reasonable 
Person Standard, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 703, 707 (2013) (“[T]he Reasonable Person Standard has 
had an invasive presence throughout much of American jurisprudence including 
administrative law, constitutional law, contract law, criminal law, and . . . tort law.”). 
89 Kofi Kessey, MD/PHD, Inc. v. Los Robles Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. B279550, 2018 WL 
459357, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018). 
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that a “reasonable person whose water supply has been contaminated by toxic wastes 
is likely to suffer serious emotional distress arising out of fear for his or her own 
health.”90 In each situation, neither personal philosophy nor partisan interests affect 
the theoretical reasonable person’s deliberative process. The assessment of 
negligence or contract interpretation is the same regardless of whether the ordinary 
observer is a Republican, Democrat, Conservative, Liberal, Climate Change believer 
or Climate Change denier. The same cannot be said for many questions concerning 
whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Would the 
reasonable person question Justice Clarence Thomas’s impartiality in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act) case because Justice 
Thomas’s wife lobbied against the Act? The answer is unequivocally “yes,” if the 
reasonable person is a Democrat.91 The answer is “absolutely not” if the observer is 
a Republican. How does the reasonable observer view Justice Elena Kagan’s 
involvement with the Affordable Care Act while serving as the President’s Solicitor 
General? Republicans saw an appearance of impropriety; Democrats did not.92  
Unlike assessing fault in negligence cases or interpreting the terms of a 
contract, “the question of whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned lies in the eye of the beholder and is often influenced by partisan, biased, 
and selfish interests.”93 
 
(a)  The Reasonable Person Is Fully Informed 
 
Contrary to the theory underlying appearance-based disqualification, the 
reasonable person standard, as constructed by the courts, does not bring the public 
into the courtroom. This is because the comprehensive factual and legal knowledge 
attributed to the arbiter of recusal issues far exceeds that of the average person and, 
                                                   
90 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 834 (Cal. 1993) (George, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
91 “Seventy-four House Democrats sent a letter to Justice Thomas suggesting that he 
disqualify himself from the health care litigation because his wife’s role in lobbying against 
the legislation created ‘the appearance of a conflict of interest.’” Raymond J. McKoski, The 
Overarching Legal Fiction: Justice Must Satisfy the Appearance of Justice, 4 SAVANNAH L. 
REV. 51, 61–62 (2017) (citing Felicia Sonmez, House Democrats Say Justice Thomas Should 
Recuse Himself in Health-Care Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2011), http://voices.washington 
post.com/44/2011/02/house-democrats-say-justice-th.html [https://perma.cc/GV9V-G2NL]. 
92 Conservatives filed an amicus brief seeking Justice Kagan’s recusal from the 
Affordable Care Act case because her involvement with the health care legislation while 
President Obama’s Solicitor General allegedly created a reasonable question as to her 
impartiality. Brief of Amicus Curiae Freedom Watch in Support of Neither Party and on 
Issue of Recusal or Disqualification of Justice Elena Kagan at 6–7, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2012 WL 72452. 
93 McKoski, supra note 18, at 452. 
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for that matter, far surpasses that of any mortal.94 Courts assume that the reasonable 
person possesses an in-depth understanding of the law, the legal system, and the 
administration of justice. For example, courts engraft onto the ordinary observer a 
mastery of substantive and procedural law, including the proper method of 
calculating a “lodestar,”95 as well as mastery of the code of judicial conduct.96 The 
“facts of life” surrounding the judiciary97 and the practice of law98 together with the 
court procedures implemented by the challenged judge99 are implanted in the 
disinterested observer’s brain. The reasonable person is also assumed to be well 
versed in the court record and draws appropriate inferences from statements in the 
transcripts.100 Of course, the reasonable person understands and appreciates the role 
politics plays in elected and appointed judiciaries.101 
                                                   
94 See, e.g., Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Bias and the Informed Observer: A Call for a 
Return to Gough, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 388, 395 (2009) (comparing the reasonable person of 
judicial ethics with the Archangel Michael). 
95 Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., No. 11-10230, 2018 WL 
3216012, at *8 (D. Mass. June 28, 2018) (finding that the reasonable person would know 
that “[a] lodestar is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonable 
expended [by a lawyer] on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”). 
96 See, e.g., WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(4) (2019) (defining the arbiters of disqualification 
as “well-informed persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the justice 
system”). 
97 Spriggs v. Gonzales, No. 07-16-00418-CV, 2018 WL 4403352, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. 
Sept. 14, 2018) (“But, that ‘reasonable person’ must be aware of the ‘facts of life’ which 
surround the judiciary.”) (quoting Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1993) (Osborn, C.J., concurring)). 
98 See, e.g., Ex Parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 116–17 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (assuming 
that community members are familiar with the everyday realities of a law practice). 
99 See, e.g., United States v. Kohring, No. 3:07–CR–00055–JWS, 2008 WL 1746700, 
at *8 (D. Alaska Apr. 14, 2008) (assuming that the ordinary observer knows the duties of the 
chief judge of a federal district court), vacated on other grounds, 637 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
100 United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the 
reasonable person reviews the record and the law); Ponder v. State, 382 S.E.2d 204, 205 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the reasonable person would infer that the defendant received 
certain admonishments at a pre-trial conference); see also Harden v. City of Gadsden, 821 
F. Supp. 1446, 1451 n.14 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (“In determining the relevant facts, a reasonable 
person would review the entire 672 pages of the trial transcript instead of relying on the 
seventeen pages appended to the City’s recusal motion.”). 
101 See A.E. Higganbotham v. Okla. Trans. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 
2003) (“It is, of course, ‘an inescapable part of our system of government that judges are 
drawn primarily from lawyers who have participated in public and political affairs.’”); In re 
Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Merit selection of federal judges means selection 
by merit from among a group that rises to attention on other grounds—grounds not 
exclusively political, but often so.”); In re Disqualification of Ghiz, 55 N.E.3d 1113, 1115 
(Ohio 2015) (“Many judges were involved in politics before taking the bench.”). 
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Few limits attach to the encyclopedic and sometimes psychic knowledge 
attributed to the average member of the public. For example, courts have attributed 
the following knowledge to the reasonable person in the context of judicial 
impartiality and recusal: 
• that the challenged judge was “evidently the first judge to have appointed a 
Master to investigate the reliability of representations made by lawyers in 
seeking an award of attorneys’ fees in a class action”;102  
• that a lawyer provided his expert witness with incomplete and inaccurate 
data;103  
• that the challenged judge found remarks directed toward him to be 
laughable;104  
• that the trial judge “was publicly ordained as a Sixth Avenue deacon”;105  
• that the challenged judge had presided over many death penalty cases without 
a challenge to the judge’s impartiality;106  
• an appellate judge’s voting record in personal injury cases;107  
• the challenged judge’s entire judicial record.108 
Burdening the average onlooker with complete knowledge and understanding 
of every facet of the law and every ruling of a judge may be a legal fiction necessary 
to excavate a disqualification decision from the nadirs of an appearance-based 
recusal scheme. But imputing this fantasized level of information to the reasonable 
person cannot advance the ABA’s desire to buttress public faith in the judiciary by 
bringing the public into the recusal process.109 There is only one way to maintain 
any modicum of legitimacy in the concept of the fully informed lay observer in 
recusal jurisprudence—enhance the reasonable person’s knowledge with artificial 
intelligence.110 
 
(b)  The Reasonable Person Is an “Outsider” 
 
In addition to requiring that the reasonable person be fully informed, 
appearance-based disqualification requires that the reasonable person not be a 
                                                   
102 Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., No. 11-10230, 2018 WL 
3216012, at *27 (D. Mass. June 28, 2018) (emphasis added). 
103 Paul v. D & B Tile of Hialeah, Inc., No. 09-60259-CIV, 2009 WL 2430901, at *5 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2009). 
104 United States v. Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99 (D. Mass. 1998). 
105 Drake v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1347 (N.D. Ala. 2007). 
106 Miles v. Ryan, 697 F.3d 1090, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2012). 
107 Doe v. Stegall, 900 So. 2d 357, 362 (Miss. 2004). 
108 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2011). 
109 See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 201 (2011) (“[T]he ‘public’ is highly unlikely to have the requisite 
‘knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry. . . .’”).  
110 See infra Part II.  
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member of the legal profession.111 That means the reasonable person deciding 
recusal issues cannot be a judge or even a lawyer.112 The lay observer requirement 
is essential if appearance-based disqualification is to maintain its theoretical claim 
as an objective test. In practice, however, it is generally the challenged judge who 
determines whether judicial impartiality might reasonably be questioned.113 Chief 
Justice John Roberts outlined recusal procedure in federal courts: 
 
All of the federal courts follow essentially the same process in resolving 
recusal questions. In the lower courts, individual judges decide for 
themselves whether recusal is warranted, sometimes in response to a 
formal written motion from a party, and sometimes at the judge’s own 
initiative.114 
 
Similarly, state court judges usually decide their own recusal issues.115 This 
widespread practice rests on historical precedent, judicial code provisions assigning 
the task to the challenged judge, and the somewhat self-serving assumption that the 
judge knows best.116 
Some states require a judge other than the challenged judge to resolve 
disqualification motions.117 But whether the challenged judge or another judge hears 
the motion, the ultimate determination is not made by someone “outside the legal 
system” as contemplated by an objective standard. To avoid this flaw in appearance-
based disqualification, courts invoke the fiction that judges disregard their own 
                                                   
111 See United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing the 
reasonable person as outside the judicial system); Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of 
Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 
197 (2007) (stating that courts “stress” that the reasonable person is a person outside the 
judicial system). 
112 Copeland v. Copeland, 904 So. 2d 1066, 1071 (Miss. 2004) (“Impartiality is viewed 
under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis using an objective reasonable ‘person, not 
a lawyer or judge, standard.’”) (citing Dodson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 839 So. 2d 530, 
534 (Miss. 2003)); see also Christina Reichert, Comment, Should I Stay or Should I Go Now: 
Foreign Law Implications for the Supreme Court’s Recusal Problem, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1195, 1218 (2014) (observing that in Australia, the reasonable person in disqualification 
matters is not a lawyer). 
113 Debra Lyn Basset, Three Reasons Why the Challenged Judge Should Not Rule on a 
Judicial Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 659, 679 (2015) (“Nevertheless, 
in the vast majority of circumstances, the challenged judge decides the disqualification 
motion.”).  
114 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 7–8 (2011). 
115 JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL 
STANDARDS 19 (2008). 
116 See McKoski, supra note 18, at 448–50 (explaining the justifications offered for 
permitting challenged judges to decide their own recusal issues).  
117 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)–(g) (2019). 
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views of the circumstances and divine how the reasonable layperson would assess 
the situation.118 Thus, the judge, as the ultimate insider, takes all the factual and legal 
information known to the judge, retreats to chambers, applies the facts and the law 
to judicial code provisions, and emerges with the average layperson’s assessment of 
whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. And the judge 
accomplishes this feat without helpful disqualification jurisprudence, focus groups, 
polling, empirical or even anecdotal evidence of how non-lawyers view the potential 
conflict. 
The process by which a judge is both the interpreter and object of the “might 
reasonably be questioned” standard is reminiscent of regulatory capture. Regulatory 
capture occurs when a regulatory agency becomes “too cozy” with the industry that 
it regulates.119 When that happens, the agency loses its objectivity in determining the 
measures necessary to protect the public from misdeeds of the regulated industry. 
The underlying causes of regulatory capture vary but usually involve: (1) a close 
personal relationship between the regulators and members of the industry; (2) 
“shared professional norms, and education, common culture or class position”; and 
(3) regulators who are former employees of the industry or hope to be employed in 
the industry when they leave the agency.120 It is bad enough when the regulators are 
so closely aligned with the regulated so as to cloud objective decision-making. Any 
suggestion that members of an industry wear two hats, one as promoters of the 
industry and another as protector of the public against overreaching by the industry 
would be dismissed as absurd. But judges are in this precise situation when 
evaluating recusal issues. The judiciary is the industry regulated by the prohibition 
against judges presiding in matters in which their impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned. At the same time, members of the judiciary are the regulators deciding 
when the test has been met. The impossibility of the conflicting positions is no 
secret.121 
 
C.  Surveying Traditional Recusal Reform Proposals 
 
Commentators suggest a series of patchwork reforms to cure the ills of 
appearance-based disqualification including: (1) requiring that independent judges 
hear recusal motions; (2) mandating written disqualification decisions; (3) the 
                                                   
118 Marko v. Marko, 816 N.W.2d 820, 827 (S.D. 2012) (“A judge’s own subjective 
view is not relevant to the ‘appearance of partiality’ inquiry. ‘Judges must imagine how a 
reasonable, well-informed observer of the judicial system would react.’” (quoting In re 
Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
119 J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018). 
120 Id.; Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: 
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVT’L. L.J. 81, 111 (2002). 
121 See State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 882 (Wis. 2010) (“Commentators have 
variously described a lack of independent review of a judge’s decision on a recusal challenge 
as ‘one of the most heavily criticized features of U.S. disqualification law,’ a ‘Catch-22’ and 
akin to having a student ‘grade his own paper.’” (citations omitted)).  
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preemptory disqualification of trial judges; and (4) granting lay panels the authority 
to decide recusal issues.122 As demonstrated below, most proposals fail to address 
the inherent failings of the current disqualification regime and proposals that do 
directly attack the faults of appearance-based disqualification have not received a 
warm reception by the courts. 
 
1.  Independent Judges 
 
Requiring a judge other than the challenged judge to rule on a motion for 
disqualification is a frequently suggested recusal reform.123 Proponents argue that an 
independent judge will assess the circumstances neutrally, avoiding the challenged 
judge’s natural inclination to deny harboring a bias and to deny engaging in conduct 
that creates an appearance of bias. As a result, the theory goes, independent judges 
are likely to grant disqualification motions more often.124 This proposal ignores the 
tendency of judges to show deference to their colleagues and the reluctance of a 
judge to impugn another judge’s impartiality by removing a fellow judge from a 
case.125 Indeed, the authors of one study concluded “that judges are more inclined to 
disqualify themselves than they are to recommend that a colleague do so.”126 But a 
more fundamental deficiency in the independent-judge proposal is that switching 
one judge for another does nothing to bring the public into the courtroom. The view 
of the reasonable layperson, which under appearance-based disqualification must 
govern the recusal decision, is still filtered through the ultimate “insider”— a judge.  
  
                                                   
122 See infra Section I.C.1.–4. 
123 See William E. Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court From Itself”?: 
Recusal, Separation of Powers, and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 772 
(2010) (stating that as of the year 2000, fifteen states required an independent judge to decide 
recusal motions and that number has remained static). 
124 See Stempel, supra note 34, at 796–97 (concluding that “there is simply too much 
inertia in favor of non-disqualification, which results in insufficiently frequent recusal when 
challenged judges assess questions of their own impartiality or public perception of it.”). 
125 See Dmitry Bam, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135, 
1192 (2015); cf. Gillian R. Chadwick, Reorienting the Rules of Evidence, 39 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2115, 2161 (2018) (“[S]trong forces make it difficult to admit the bias that exists in 
one’s own community.”); Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented 
Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 585–86 (2005) (“A more significant 
problem with this proposal is that judges might not be any more willing to disqualify their 
colleagues than they are to recuse themselves. Judges might find it difficult to grant a motion 
to disqualify, fearing it would offend a fellow judge.”). 
126 JEFFERY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 67 (Am. Judicature Soc’y 1995) 
(“The data from this survey show that judges are more inclined to disqualify themselves than 
they are to recommend that a colleague do so.”). 
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2.  Mandating that Judges Provide Reasons Supporting Recusal Decisions 
 
Some commentators promote a requirement that judges provide written or 
recorded reasons for granting or denying disqualification motions as a way to 
develop a body of case law upon which judges may rely in assessing whether their 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.127 Even staunch supporters of the 
proposal, however, admit that the failure of judges to record their rationales, “is not 
the gravest problem with modern disqualification.”128 That is because an increase in 
written recusal decisions is of little value when reviewing courts caution that 
disqualification motions should be decided on their unique facts rather than “by 
comparison to similar situations addressed by prior jurisprudence.”129 Moreover, 
most written recusal decisions offer little substantive analysis. Judges often follow 
a simple decisional format by: (1) detailing the facts surrounding the disqualification 
issue; (2) reciting general propositions of disqualification law;130 and (3) concluding 
that “clearly,” “plainly,” or “undoubtedly” the reasonable observer would not 
question the judge’s impartiality under the circumstances presented.131 Finally, as 
with the majority of other proposals to reform the disqualification process, a judicial 
officer, not an outsider, determines whether a judge remains on a case. 
                                                   
127 Stempel, supra note 34, at 799 (“Written explanations of recusal decisions would 
also in turn develop a more comprehensive body of precedent to guide the legal community 
and the bench.”); see also Melinda A. Marbes, Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating 
Decisionmaker Bias and Promoting Public Confidence, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 807, 857 (2015) 
(arguing that written decisions “will not only legitimize the specific disqualification decision, 
but will help create an entire body of law on disqualification that will guide future disputes 
and legitimize the judiciary as a whole.”). 
128 Stempel, supra note 34, at 799. 
129 United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 80 
and accompanying text. 
130 See, e.g., Pellegrini v. Merchant, No. 1:16-cv-01292 LJO-BAM, 2017 WL 735740, 
at *2–*3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017). 
131 See, e.g., United States v. Mix, No. 12–171, 2014 WL 580758, at *16 (E.D. La. Feb. 
13, 2014) (“Clearly the foregoing facts do not present an instance where reasonable person, 
knowing all of the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality as is 
required under § 455(a).”); Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 639, 647 
(E.D. La. 2006) (“Clearly, a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would 
recognize that the undersigned would be impartial.”); Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 792 F. Supp. 
72, 74–75 (D. Alaska 1992) (“Clearly, a reasonable person would not doubt a judge’s 
impartiality on that basis. While the average citizen might believe federal judges are for sale, 
it is unlikely that she would believe they come so cheap.”); see also Perlmutter v. Verone, 
No. GJH–14–2566, 2015 WL 4757183, at *5 n.8 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2015) (quoting a state 
court judge’s finding that the “vague allegations . . . plainly would not provide a reasonable 
person with grounds to question Judge Salant’s impartiality.”); Leja v. Schmidt Mfg., Inc., 
Civ. No. 01–5042(DRD), 2010 WL 2571850, *3 (D. N.J. June 22, 2010) (quoting a state 
judge’s finding that a “reasonable person would undoubtedly draw the conclusion” that the 
judge was not disqualified). 
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3.  Peremptory Challenges 
 
Similar to a party’s right to peremptorily excuse a prospective juror, eighteen 
states permit a litigant to disqualify one trial judge automatically.132 Some states 
require a simple request to remove a judge, while other jurisdictions require a 
perfunctory affidavit claiming that the judge is biased against a party.133 Although 
not without its critics,134 the automatic substitution of judges has worked reasonably 
well135 for more than one hundred and seventy years.136 Preemptory challenges work 
precisely because they reject the major tenant of appearance-based 
disqualification—that a disinterested, objective, fully informed person determine 
that a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  
Peremptory disqualification is not governed by an objective standard.137 The 
view of the ordinary, reasonable person plays no role in deciding whether a judge 
remains on a case. To the contrary, peremptorily removing a judge employs a 
quintessentially subjective test. A litigant’s subjective opinion of a judge’s 
impartiality controls. Nor does such automatic disqualification require a fully 
informed decision-maker. A litigant exercising a peremptory challenge can be 
uninformed, misinformed, or delusional for that matter. Likewise, peremptory 
disqualification does not demand a disinterested decision-maker. Unlike the 
reasonable person, a litigant is the most interested and least objective person in the 
courtroom. Further, peremptory disqualification statutes provide what is impossible 
under appearance-based rules—predictable and uniform results. If a litigant makes 
a request or files a motion, the judge is disqualified. 
Two dynamics prevent peremptory disqualification from effectively reforming 
recusal procedures. First, the number of states with peremptory disqualification 
statutes has not increased in the last forty years,138 and the federal courts are 
unalterably opposed to the procedure.139 Second, instead of replacing the “might 
                                                   
132 See McKoski, supra note 18, at 468 (citing ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 6 n.17 (2011) (listing states 
permitting the automatic disqualification of trial judges)). The preemptory disqualification 
of reviewing court judges presents unique problems. See id. at 472 n.382. 
133 Id. at 468–69. 
134 Id. at 470–72.  
135 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges as Access Enhancers, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2263, 2265 (2018) [hereinafter Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges] 
(stating that peremptory disqualification “appears to work well”). 
136 See, e.g., McGoon v. Little, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 42 (1845) (citing the statute requiring an 
automatic change of judge upon the filing of an affidavit by a party alleging judicial 
prejudice). 
137 See John R. Bartels, Peremptory Challenges to Federal Judges: A Judge’s View, 68 
A.B.A. J. 449, 451 (1982) (criticizing the subjective nature of peremptory judicial recusal). 
138 Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges, supra note 135, at 2272. 
139 Bartels, supra note 137, at 450–51; see also David Ingram, Federal Judges Push 
Back Against Recusal Proposals, Congress Considers Revising Rules on Judge 
Disqualifications, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 14, 2009 (“The Judicial Conference has opposed 
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reasonably be questioned test” with the right to an automatic substitution of one trial 
judge, jurisdictions adopting peremptory disqualification have retained the 
appearance-based test. That means judges still must apply the test when a litigant 
claims that a successor judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.140 
 
4.  Judicial Recusal Panels 
 
Professor Dmitri Bam proposes a change to recusal procedures that, consistent 
with the theoretical foundation of appearance-based disqualification, places the 
recusal decision in the hands of those outside the judiciary.141 Bam suggests that 
panels of laypersons could offer guidance to judges facing recusal issues or, better 
yet, review a judge’s decision or make the decision for the judge.142 However, no 
state has been bold enough to embark on a procedure that would sanction joint fact-
finding by judges and laypersons or authorize a lay panel to overrule a judge’s 
decision. 
 
II.  THE ADVANTAGES OF BIG DATA 
 
This Article proposes that big data can transform appearance-based 
disqualification into what its creators envisioned—an objective test producing 
uniform disqualification decisions.143 Injecting big data into the recusal process will 
ensure the involvement of a fully informed, reasonable, decision-maker who sits 
outside the judicial system. It will eliminate or significantly reduce implicit judicial 
biases in the decision-making process, reduce judicial stress, and save precious 
                                                   
[automatic disqualification] proposals for at least three decades. . . .”); Russell R. Wheeler, 
A Primer on Regulating Federal Judicial Ethics, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 490 (2014) (stating 
that in 2009, the United States Judicial Conference resisted an automatic disqualification 
proposal for federal judges “on the practical grounds that finding replacement judges in small 
districts would be difficult and on the policy grounds that giving parties the right of automatic 
disqualification was akin to permitting judge-shopping.”).  
140 Challenges to successor judges based on an appearance of bias would likely be few 
in number. See McKoski, supra note 18, at 472 (“Allowing each party one peremptory 
challenge should satisfy most litigants that an impartial trial judge will decide their case.”). 
141 Bam, supra note 125, at 1191–92. 
142 Id. Professor Bam also suggests that lawyers could join laypersons on the recusal 
panels. Id. at 1191. Other authors have made similar suggestions. Cf. Roy A. Schotland, A 
Plea for Reality, 74 MO. L. REV. 507, 521 (2009) (suggesting that before ruling on a recusal 
motion, reviewing court justices consult “with a panel of three court-appointed ‘wise souls’ 
(probably retired judges, lawyers, and legal academics. . . .)”). However, one might observe 
that Professor Bam’s suggestion to include lawyers on recusal panels would detract from the 
intended “outsider” makeup of the panels. 
143 See Hearings, supra note 21, at 13 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (justifying the 
adoption of an objective test to govern federal disqualification by the need to bring “clarity 
and certainty” to judicial disqualification); Geyh, supra note 16, at 691 (identifying one goal 
of appearance-based disqualification as making judicial disqualification “less capricious”). 
 
406 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
judicial resources. Importantly, even if big data analytics proves to be unhelpful in 
this regard, the experiment will not injure any litigant or diminish public confidence 
in the judiciary. 
 
A.  Big Data Fully-Informs the Reasonable Person 
 
Big data legitimatizes an essential—yet currently fictional—characteristic of 
the lay decision-maker in judicial disqualification matters—that the reasonable 
person is fully informed. This unbounded knowledge and wisdom attributed to the 
lay observer is currently an unmitigated fiction.144 Much of the information 
attributed to the ordinary observer in the context of judicial recusals is actually 
unknown to the person on the street and, in some cases, is even beyond the judge’s 
knowledge or recollection. For example, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Judge 
Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a 
disqualification motion, finding that “[a] reasonable person familiar with [his] 
judicial record throughout [his] career, and the other facts relevant to this recusal 
inquiry” would not question Judge Reinhardt’s impartiality.145 It seems safe to say 
that the ordinary observer would not have command of the rulings made by Judge 
Reinhardt during his thirty-year career as a federal judge.146 It is also reasonable to 
assume that Judge Reinhardt would not recall every case in which he participated. 
The reasonable observer, however, enhanced with big data’s access to the pleadings, 
motions, orders, transcripts, and other court documents in each of the thousands of 
matters handled by Judge Reinhardt would be completely familiar with the judge’s 
judicial record. Moreover, big data would include each of Judge Reinhardt’s 
speeches and law review articles relevant to the recusal inquiry.147 
 
B.  Big Data Is Not an Insider 
 
As discussed above, one reason the “might reasonably be questioned” test fails 
to live up to its objective label is that an “insider”—a judge—rather than someone 
outside the legal system, decides recusal questions.148 Indeed, the ultimate insider, 
the challenged judge, usually determines whether the circumstances call into 
question the judge’s impartiality. Permitting big data to control the ethical propriety 
of a judge remaining on a case removes this “insider” impediment by applying a 
                                                   
144 See supra Section I.B.2.a. 
145 630 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2011). 
146 Id. (stating that Judge Reinhardt had been a member of the federal judiciary for thirty 
years). 
147 In discussing the reasonable person’s view of the facts supporting the recusal motion 
in Perry, Judge Reinhardt cites one of his law review articles, Stephen Reinhardt, The 
Conflict Between Text and Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
434 (1988), adapted from a speech at the Federalist Society’s Sixth Annual Symposium on 
Law and Public Policy. Perry, 630 F.3d at 916. 
148 See supra Section I.B.2.b. 
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truly objective test. With big data analytics, the judge is no longer the sole interpreter 
and object of the appearance-based disqualification standard. 
 
C.  Big Data Mitigates the Cognitive Biases of Judges 
 
Predictive algorithms have the potential to eliminate or reduce cognitive and 
other biases that distort judicial decisions, including rulings in disqualification 
matters.149 Implicit biases reflecting negative stereotyping based on race, gender 
identity, age, immigration status, and other characteristics may work to the detriment 
of even “privileged minorities.”150 Compounding the problem, the subconscious 
misuse of decision-making heuristics may influence the objectivity of a judge’s 
decision.151 To reduce automatic biases at work in bail and sentencing decisions, 
some courts have instructed judges to use algorithms known as risk assessment 
tools.152 Big data analytics can be employed in the same manner to reduce 
subconscious biases in disqualification decisions. Although some bias may be 
inherent in algorithmic processing because humans create the algorithms,153 at least 
the biases will not be those of the challenged judge.154 
  
                                                   
149 See STANFORD U., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030 8 (2016), 
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/88Y2-RXXL] (“AI prediction tools have the potential to provide new kinds of 
transparency about data and inferences, and may be applied to detect, remove, or reduce 
human bias, rather than reinforcing it.”); Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A 
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 113 (2017) (finding 
that “automatic biases and cognitions indeed influence a much broader range of judicial 
decisions than has ever been considered.”). 
150 Levinson et al., supra note 149, at 68. 
151 See Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental 
Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis”, 99 KY. L.J. 269, 306–07 (2011). 
152 Marla N. Greenstein, Judicial Ethics of Bail Decision Making, 57 JUDGES’ J. 40, 40 
(2018). For a description of risk assessments tools used in the pre-trial release decisions 
involving criminal defendants, see Brook Hopkins & Colin Doyle, The Pathways of Pretrial 
Reform, 57 JUDGES’ J. 31, 33 (2018). 
153 See Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 
859 n.85 (2018) (“There is a growing literature on the biases inherent in artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, and algorithmic processing.”). 
154 The danger of embedding implicit biases into algorithms used to decide 
disqualification issues lies in the fact that “AI systems are commonly ‘taught’ by reading, 
viewing, and listening to copies of works created by humans[,]” Amanda Levendowski, How 
Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 
579, 582 (2018), and judges and lawyers will have authored many of the documents used to 
inform recusal algorithms. 
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D.  Big Data Brings Collateral Benefits to the Judiciary 
 
Reliance on big data will produce the collateral benefit of reducing judicial 
stress.155 It will also free-up judicial time for other tasks. Because challenges to 
judicial impartiality go to the essence of a judge’s worth, judges often feel compelled 
to refute the charge in excruciating detailed, time-consuming, lengthy orders.156  
 
E.  Big Data Can Do No Harm 
 
Courts can incorporate big data into the disqualification process in a way to 
protect litigants’ rights and public confidence in the judiciary, even if big data 
analytics fails to produce results more uniform and consistent than the current 
disqualification regime. First, state and federal judicial conduct codes direct judges 
to initially determine whether recusal is required.157 This self-assessment is 
obligatory regardless of whether a litigant files a motion for the judge’s 
disqualification.158 If the judge recuses herself at this initial stage, the matter is 
assigned to another judge.159 No other inquiry, with or without the help of big data, 
is necessary. Second, if after the initial assessment, the judge concludes that recusal 
is not required but that facts exist that “the parties or their lawyers might reasonably 
consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification,” judicial codes require 
the judge to disclose that information.160 If, after the disclosure, a litigant files a 
motion for disqualification, the judge may grant the motion, and the case will be 
reassigned to another judge.161 If the judge does not summarily grant the 
disqualification motion, then under the procedure suggested here, the judge would 
refer the matter for a big data analysis. Third, under the current procedure, a litigant 
                                                   
155 Cf. Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 653 
(2015) (“Even an unbiased judge may worry that a recusal sends a message that he is 
biased.”); R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse: Foreign Common Law Guidance 
& Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1833 (2005) 
(“[A]sking a challenged Justice to rule on a motion to recuse puts that Justice in a precarious 
position.”). 
156 See, e.g., Ark. Teacher Retirement System v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., No. 
11-10230, 2018 WL 3216012, at *1 (D. Mass 2018) (denying a recusal motion in a 17,000-
word order); United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D. Mass. 2015) (denying a 
recusal motion in a 29,000-word order); United States v. Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. 
Mass. 1998) (denying a motion to recuse in a 14,000-word order). 
157 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A judge 
shall disqualify himself or herself . . .”). 
158 Id. 
159 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (providing for reassignment to a successor judge 
upon a judge’s recusal). 
160 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
161 See infra note 164. 
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may file a disqualification motion independent of any disclosure by the judge.162 In 
that event, the judge may again summarily grant the motion, and the case will be 
reassigned to another judge.163 Under the proposed procedure, if the judge does not 
summarily grant the motion, the judge would refer the matter for a big data analysis. 
Optimally, big data’s conclusion as to whether the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned would constitute a mandatory presumption. Thus, if 
analytics determined that the circumstances created a reasonable question as to the 
judge’s impartiality, recusal would be required. If the analysis determined that no 
reasonable question of the judge’s impartiality existed, the case would remain with 
the judge. However, courts may resist surrendering the disqualification decision to 
artificial intelligence.164 If so, as an alternative, the conclusion arrived at through 
analytics could serve as a rebuttable presumption, leaving the final recusal decision 
with the judge.165  
Most importantly, this disqualification protocol protects the parties and the 
public if the big data analysis process proves a failure because the parties would be 
in no worse positions than under current recusal procedures. Under the suggested 
procedure, a judge only sends a case for a big data evaluation if the judge initially 
                                                   
162 See, e.g., RULES OF PROC. OF CAL. ST. BAR, R. 5.46(H) (2019) (“If a judge refuses 
or fails to disqualify himself or herself, any party may file a motion to disqualify.”); TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 18a(a) (2019) (“A party in a case in any trial court other than a statutory probate court 
or justice court may seek to recuse or disqualify a judge who is sitting in the case by filing a 
motion with the clerk of the court in which the case is pending.”); W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 
17.01(a) (2019) (“In any proceeding, any party may file a written motion for disqualification 
of a judge within thirty (30) days after discovering the ground for disqualification. . . .”); see 
also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
LAW 73 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2010) (“[T]he disqualification process [in federal 
court] may be triggered by a judge on his or her own initiative, or by a party, on motion.”). 
163 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 42.2(e)(4) (2019) (“If grounds for disqualification are 
found, the presiding judge must promptly reassign the action.”); U.S. Dist. Ct. R. D. Vt., 
Order 73(h) (2015) (“If a judge is disqualified to hear a case assigned to him/her, the judge 
will provide the clerk with a disqualification order and the clerk shall reassign the case at 
random.”). 
164 See Tania Sourdin & Richard Cornes, Do Judges Need to be Human? The 
Implications of Technology for Responsive Judging, in THE RESPONSIVE JUDGE: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 87 (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2018) (“[T]he 
capacity for [artificial intelligence] decisions to be appealed or reviewed by human decision-
makers is often cited as a necessary component of any automated decision-making system.”); 
Noel L. Hillmam, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 58 
JUDGES’ J. 36 (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_ 
journal/2019/winter/the-use-artificial-intelligence-gauging-risk-recidivism/ [https://perma. 
cc/4HKF-YZT4] (arguing that sentencing is a human endeavor and “should not be merely 
the function of an algorithm”).  
165 Presumptions are not unknown in judicial disqualification jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 9 (2019) (“There is a rebuttable presumption that 
there is no per se basis for disqualification where the aggregate [campaign] contributions are 
equal to or less than the maximum allowable contribution permitted by law.”). 
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decides to keep the case. For example, assume that a party files a disqualification 
motion that the judge believes lacks merit. Under the suggested procedure, the judge 
could not deny the motion without referring the matter for a big data evaluation. The 
outcome of the analysis may confirm the judge’s determination that the 
circumstances do not create an appearance of partiality. But even if big data’s 
conclusion is wrong, the parties are in no worse position because the judge had 
initially denied the motion for disqualification. On the other hand, if big data 
analytics erroneously concludes that the circumstances create an appearance of 
partiality, the parties are no worse off because the only consequence of the erroneous 
finding is that the case is assigned to another judge who is presumed to be 
impartial.166 And, while parties have a right to an impartial judge, they have no right 
to a particular judge.167 In the end, regardless of the accuracy of the big data analysis, 
the parties receive an impartial judge and the public benefits from a truly objective 
disqualification decision. 
An examination of disqualification issues that arise from contributions by 
lawyers and litigants to a judicial candidate’s election campaign illustrates how 
analytics can help cure the deficiencies in appearance-based disqualification and 
provide an objective determination of when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned. 
 
III.  CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:  
A BIG DATA APPROACH 
 
The disqualification of judges because of contributions made by lawyers, 
litigants, and interest groups to the judges’ election campaigns supplies the perfect 
test for disqualification decisions informed by big data. That is so for two reasons. 
First, the effect of campaign contributions on a judge’s impartiality—in fact and 
appearance—continues to perplex the courts, commentators, and the public.168 There 
simply is no generally accepted method of determining when a judge should be 
barred from hearing a contributor’s case or when a judge’s impartiality might 
                                                   
166 The transfer of a case to a successor judge may cause a delay in the proceedings but 
that delay is present every time a judge is disqualified or otherwise removed from a case. 
167 United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 122 (D. Mass 2015) (“Litigants are 
entitled to a judge who is, and to a reasonable person appears to be, impartial. However, they 
are not entitled to a judge of their own choosing.”); State v. Harris, 735 N.W.2d 774, 782–
83 (Neb. 2007) (“[W]hile a defendant may be entitled to an impartial judge, a defendant does 
not have the right to have his or her case heard before any particular judge.”). 
168 See Matthew W. Green, Jr. et al., The Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its 
Effect on Judicial Independence, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 505 (2012) (concluding that 
campaign contributions to judges presents a difficult problem with no easy solutions); Aman 
McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial Selection Reform 
Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 521 (2005) (noting the “ineffectiveness” of reforms 
intended to diminish the appearance of partiality caused by judges receiving campaign 
contributions). 
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reasonably be questioned because of a person or entity’s financial support of a 
judge’s election bid.169 Second, there is an enormous amount of highly relevant 
public information that, with the aid of big data analytics, can make campaign 
contribution disqualification decisions uniform, consistent, and reliable.170  
A simple rule could eliminate any appearance of bias created by campaign 
contributions. The rule would automatically disqualify a judge from a case in which 
a lawyer or litigant contributed to the judge’s campaign in a sum greater than an 
amount predetermined by the jurisdiction to cause the lay observer to reasonably 
question the judge’s impartiality. The ABA has suggested this approach since 
1999.171 A simple approach, however, is not necessarily a popular approach. Only 
five states have taken the ABA’s advice and require a judge’s recusal after the 
judge’s campaign receives a contribution above a preset limit.172 Utah’s Code of 
Judicial Conduct provides for mandatory recusal when a judge receives 
contributions totaling more than $50.00 from a lawyer or litigant in a three-year 
period.173 States without a judicial code provision setting an automatic recusal 
amount rely on the general “might reasonably be questioned” standard to determine 
when a contribution creates a disqualifying appearance of partiality.174 Courts in 
                                                   
169 See infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text. 
170 See infra notes 187–204 and accompanying text. 
171 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999). 
172 Alabama, Arizona, California, Mississippi, and Utah all mandate disqualification 
when contributions reach a certain amount. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS CTR. FOR 
JUD. ETHICS, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS (Nov. 
2016), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20 
Ethics/Disqualificationcontributions.ashx [https://perma.cc/KF3V-GBC7]. The Arizona 
judicial code requires disqualification in matters involving a party or lawyer who has “within 
the previous four years made aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign an amount that 
is greater than the amounts permitted [by state law].” ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 
2.11(A)(4) (2009); see also Ryan M. Mcinerney, Note, Rethinking Judicial Disqualifications 
Based on Campaign Contributions: A Practical Critique of Post-Caperton Proposals and a 
Call for Greater Transparency, 11 NEV. L.J. 815, 821 (2011) (“[M]ost states have been 
hesitant to adopt [ABA] Model Rule 2.11(A)(4) or similar disqualification language that 
takes into account campaign support, no matter how large.”). 
173 UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2018). 
174 See, e.g., Pa. Jud. Conduct Board, Statement of Policy Regarding Disqualification 
Based on Campaign Contributions Under Rule 2.11(A)(4), at 5 (Nov. 4, 2016), 
http://judicialconductboardofpa.org/wp-content/uploads/11-04-2016-Press-Release-Board-
Issues-Statements-of-Policy-Regarding-Investigations-of-Campaign-Contributions-Electro 
nic-Communications.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCF8-4LS5] [hereinafter Pa. Statement of 
Policy] (stating the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “eschewed” any rule automatically 
requiring disqualification upon a contribution above a fixed amount); see also WIS. SUP. CT. 
R. 60.04(7) (2014) (“A judge shall not be required to recuse himself or herself in a proceeding 
based solely on any endorsement or the judge’s campaign committee’s receipt of a lawful 
campaign contribution, including a campaign contribution from an individual or entity 
involved in the proceeding.”). 
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those states often provide a nonexclusive list of factors to help a judge decide if a 
contribution necessitates disqualification.175  
The amount of money contributed to a judge’s campaign usually tops the list of 
relevant factors.176 But even more important than the amount itself is the amount of 
the contribution in relation to the total amount of money raised by the judicial 
candidate.177 Thus, a $2,000 contribution when a candidate raises a total of $4,000 
might be more significant than if the $2,000 contribution is part of a candidate’s two 
million dollar war chest.178 The timing of a contribution may also affect the public’s 
perception of a judge’s impartiality179 because “the effect of contributions will 
generally dissipate over time.”180 Similarly, a contribution might increase the 
perception of bias if made close in time to the filing of a lawsuit or the setting of a 
trial date.181 Although admittedly difficult to gauge, courts consider the impact of a 
contribution on the outcome of an election.182 Thus, if a lawyer or litigant makes a 
sizable contribution to underwrite an extensive media campaign in the final stages 
of a close contest, that contribution may be more likely to create an appearance of 
bias than if the candidate uses a similar contribution early in the campaign for a voter 
                                                   
175 See, e.g., GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2019). 
176 See, e.g., id. R. 2.11(A)(4)(a). 
177 See WASH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(D)(1) (2013) (identifying a relevant 
factor to be “the total amount of financial support provided by the party relative to the total 
amount of the financial support for the judge’s election”); Pa. Statement of Policy, supra 
note 174, at 6 (suggesting one factor to be “the amount of contribution[s] in relation to the 
total amount of contributions received by the judge. . . .”).  
178 See Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 299 P.3d 354, 358 (Nev. 2013) (finding 
disqualification unnecessary where the trial judge received $10,000 in campaign 
contributions from a party and the party’s lawyer and the contribution constituted 14% of the 
total raised by the judge). 
179 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009) (“The 
temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the 
pendency of the case is also critical.”). 
180 Pa. Statement of Policy, supra note 174, at 2 (“[T]he effect of contributions will 
generally dissipate over time. The larger the contribution, the longer it will take to 
dissipate.”). 
181 Id. at 9; see also TENN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. [7](3) (2015) 
(identifying one relevant factor to be “[t]he timing of the support or contributions in relation 
to the case for which disqualification is sought.”); Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign 
Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html [https://perma.cc/ARQ5-YFBN] 
(“On scores of occasions, the [Ohio Supreme Court] justices’ campaigns took contributions 
after a case involving the contributor was argued and before it was decided—just when 
conflicts are most visible and pointed.”). 
182 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884 (stating that the disqualification inquiry centers in 
part on “the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election”). 
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registration drive.183 The nature of the judicial office sought might also influence the 
public’s perception of a donation because the public expects and tolerates larger 
contributions for higher judicial offices.184  
While important, the factors identified by the courts appear to be limited by 
what information the courts believe that the parties can reasonably assemble on the 
disqualification issue. Except for the impact of a particular contribution on an 
election outcome, all of the information identified as relevant to a contribution-
related disqualification question is available on campaign disclosure websites.185 In 
the era of big data, however, there is no reason to exclude other highly relevant 
information simply because it is much too voluminous for the parties to gather or 
make sense of. For example, a donor’s history of contributions in all judicial 
campaigns would certainly be relevant to a judge’s recusal decision. Has the 
contributor donated a similar amount to every judge running for election or 
retention? Has the donor only contributed to judges before whom the donor has 
cases? Is the contribution in question part of a pattern of contributions from similarly 
situated donors like plaintiffs’ lawyers or the insurance industry?186 How does the 
contribution amount compare in size and timing to contributions received statewide, 
region-wide, and nationwide by other judicial candidates, adjusted for differences in 
population, geographic area, and cost of living in the various election districts?187 
                                                   
183 Cf. id. at 897 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“What if the supporter’s expenditures are 
used to fund voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts rather than television 
advertisements?”). 
184 See Pa. Statement of Policy, supra note 174, at 6. 
185 See, e.g., Campaign Finance Database, FLA. DEPT. OF STATE, https://dos.elections. 
myflorida.com/campaign-finance/contributions [https://perma.cc/CM24-Q48T] (providing a 
searchable database for Florida state candidates from 1996–2018); Steve Parks for Judge 
2014, MICHIGAN SECRETARY OF STATE, MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE SEARCHABLE 
DATABASE, https://cfrsearch.nictusa.com/committees/516682 [https://perma.cc/L8NX-
DBAW]; id. at Campaign Statement Contributions, https://cfrsearch.nictusa.com/documents 
/387975/details/filing/contributions?schedule=1A&changes=0 [https://perma.cc/E7JD-
KSXJ] (identifying campaign contributions by date, amount, donor name, donor address, and 
donor occupation; identifying expenditures by date, amount, nature of the expenditure, 
payee; identifying debts and obligations); see also Contributions and Expenditures 
Databases, N.Y. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.ny.gov/contribandex 
pend.html [https://perma.cc/VJ6G-WULS]; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(7) cmt. (2014) (requiring 
the public reporting of all campaign contributions). 
186 See Catherine Turcer & Mia Lewis, Can Money Buy Justice? Contributions to Ohio 
Supreme Court Candidates 2018, COMMON CAUSE OHIO (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.commoncause.org/ohio/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2018/10/OhioSupreme 
Court_WEB_r1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK2B-SDNK] (listing the top donors, and amounts 
donated to four state supreme court candidates). 
187 See generally Newspaper Ad Prices – by State, GABLER.COM, 
http://www.gaebler.com/newspaper-ad-rates.htm [https://perma.cc/E5JN-EWQS] (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2019) (listing newspaper advertising rates for urban, suburban, and rural 
publications). 
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Under some circumstances, campaign contributions made by the judge sought to be 
disqualified may be relevant.188  
In addition to detailed campaign contribution histories, big data can supply 
relevant litigation information.189 What is the win-loss record of the contributor 
before the judge?190 How often does the contributing party or lawyer appear before 
the judge?191 Is the issue before the judge likely to affect other cases, or is it unique 
to the contributor’s case?192 Has the judge ruled on the issue previously? Did the 
                                                   
188 Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of Selection: A Nationwide 
Study of the Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1735–36 (2017) (assessing 
the ideological preferences of judges, in part, by examining whether a judge contributed to 
Democrat or Republican candidates). 
189 For example, LexisNexis describes its “Context for Judges” as “a new offering from 
the Lexis AnalyticsÔ suite” where “legal language analytics are deployed across tens of 
millions of Lexis Advance case law documents” to produce and correlate judges’ rulings on 
“100 different motion types.” Context for Judges: Know the Language. Write a Persuasive 
Motion, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/context/judges.page 
[https://perma.cc/B9J2-3RES] (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). The director of LexisNexis 
product management explains, “No-one else can begin to do this—we’re not just saying ‘did 
the judge grant this or deny that’ but what is the exact language he or she used. We take 
every sentence and turn it into a data point that can be studied.” LexisNexis Launches Well-
Trailed Judge and Expert Witness Analytics Solution Context, LEGAL IT INSIDER (Nov. 29, 
2018, 1:28 PM), https://www.legaltechnology.com/latest-news/lexisnexis-launches-well-
trailed-judge-and-expert-witness-analytics-solution-context [https://perma.cc/6QWL-A9S4] 
(quoting LexisNexis director of product management Mark Koussa). “Context” provides 
court records for all federal judges and some state court judges. See LEXIS ADVANCE, 
LEXISNEXIS CONTEXT SEARCH, https://advance.lexis.com/contexthome?cbc=0&crid=e421 
2ebb-aa97-4936-ab0a-c85266f9a951# [https://perma.cc/3AFS-RKAA] (last visited Sept. 
17, 2019). 
190 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1, 
25 n.111 (2011) (listing private attorneys who were major donors to the campaigns of Illinois 
Supreme Court Justices and the contributors’ win and loss records before the court after the 
donations); see also Andrew L. Frey & Jeffrey A. Berger, A Solution in Search of a Problem: 
The Disconnect Between the Outcome in Caperton and the Circumstances of Justice 
Benjamin’s Election, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 279, 287–88 (2010). 
191 Rotunda, supra note 190, at 22 (“[F]ewer than 4% of the lawyers or parties who 
appeared before the Illinois Supreme Court made a contribution to a winning candidate”); 
see also Frey & Berger, supra note 190, at 286 (suggesting that whether a contributor is a 
“repeat litigant” before the judge is of equal importance to whether the contributor has a case 
pending before the judge at the time of the contribution). 
192 See Woodland Hills Residents Ass’n. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 609 P.2d 
1029, 1036 (Cal. 1980) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (recognizing that “the 
significance of the issue being considered, would be relevant in judging the appearance of 
bias”); see also N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 4 (N.D. SUP. CT. 2012) (directing 
the judge to consider “the issues involved in the proceeding” when deciding a recusal issue 
involving campaign contributions); Nicholas Almendares & Catherine Hafer, Beyond 
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judge campaign on the issue at stake, or has the judge written, spoken, or tweeted 
about the issue?193 Has the judge disqualified herself from other cases involving the 
same party or lawyer, or from cases in which a party or lawyer contributed a similar 
amount?194 Big data can supply the reasonable person with this information. 195 
Big data can also help evaluate “the apparent effect [a] contribution had on the 
outcome of the election.”196 While the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of this factor, the Court also conceded that requiring a judge to determine 
“what ultimately drives the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult 
endeavor, not likely to lend itself to a certain conclusion.”197 Because weighing this 
factor amounts to nothing more than uneducated guesswork, some courts pay lip 
service to the effect of a contribution on the election outcome but ignore the factor 
in evaluating the disqualification issue.198 Analytics could legitimize this 
consideration by providing an educated assessment of the “apparent effect” of a 
contribution by evaluating factors known to influence the success or failure of 
judicial candidates. These factors could include, the size and timing of the 
contribution in question; other financing; the use to which the contribution is put; 
advertising efforts; budget; name; gender; name recognition; voter turnout; voter 
roll-off; ballot position; negative campaign tactics; political and economic 
environment; endorsements by newspapers, political groups, individuals, unions, 
and trade associations; and “blue” and “red” waves.199 
                                                   
Citizens United, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2755, 2786 (2016) (identifying one factor as “the 
stake the contributor has in the policy at hand.”). 
193 See Request to Recuse the Hon. Sharon Kennedy, Capital Care Network of Toledo 
v. State Dep’t Department of Health, 153 Ohio St. 3d 362, 2018-Ohio-440, 106 N.E. 3d 1209 
(Aug. 17, 2017), http://supremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=829404. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/B9QM-E6T9] (seeking disqualification of a state supreme court justice 
from a case involving an abortion provider in part because the judge (1) was the keynote 
speaker at a right to life function; (2) stated in a questionnaire that life begins at fertilization; 
and (3) stated that the Ohio Constitution contains no provision intended to require the use of 
public funds for abortion). 
194 See Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Phillips, 502 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Ark. 2016) 
(noting that the judge had recused from cases involving “significant contributions” after 
previous elections). 
195 Cf. Frey & Berger, supra note 190, at 280 (criticizing Caperton for “its 
unwillingness to evaluate the entire universe of facts”). 
196 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009). 
197 Id. at 885; see also Frey & Berger, supra note 190, at 282–92 (discussing the 
difficulty in determining what influences an election outcome).  
198 See, e.g., Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 299 P.3d 354, 357–59 (Nev. 2013) 
(mentioning the “apparent effect” factor, but never applying it to the facts of the case). 
199 See Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the 
Moment May Decide Your Future, 18 J. L. & POL. 643, 644 (2002); see also John Council, 
‘Blue Wave’ Hits Texas Judiciary as Democrats Win Seats on Four Appellate Courts, TEX. 
LAW. (Nov. 7, 2018) (“In upsets that few political observers . . . expected, Democrats took 
five seats each on Houston’s all-Republican First Court of Appeals and all-Republican 
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The algorithms developed to interpret big data in recusal matters could integrate 
the public’s view of judicial elections and campaign contributions. On one hand, the 
public overwhelmingly supports selecting judges by election rather than by 
appointment. A Harris poll disclosed that 55% of respondents favored elected judges 
while 19% favored appointed judges.200 An Alabama survey found that 85% of 
voters preferred elected judges.201 On the other hand, polls consistently reveal that 
approximately three-quarters of voters believe that campaign contributions have 
some effect on judicial decisions.202 The relative weight assigned to these factors by 
a particular jurisdiction in a big data analysis could vary widely.203 Regardless of the 
different weights assigned by the states, the inclusion of public survey results would 
allow public perceptions of elected judges and campaign contributions to play some 
role in the disqualification equation. 
The point here is not to identify the precise nature of the information included 
in the dataset or to assign weights to factors incorporated into a disqualification 
algorithm. The point is that using analytics to determine whether the average person 
might reasonably question a judge’s impartiality facilitates consistent, uniform, and 
objective disqualification decisions, something that has eluded the legal system 
since the origin of appearance-based disqualification in 1972. The impact of 
                                                   
Fourteenth Court of Appeals, eight seats on Dallas’ all-Republican Fifth Court of Appeals, 
four seats on Austin’s all-Republican Third Courts of Appeals and four seats on San 
Antonio’s Fourth Court of Appeals.”). See generally Albert J. Klumpp, Judicial Primary 
Elections in Cook County, Illinois: Fear the Irish Women!, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 821 (2011) 
(discussing the effect of political party slating, endorsements from newspapers and bar 
associations, ballot cues, and money on judicial election success). 
200 Most Americans Want State Judges to be Elected, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Oct. 20, 
2008), https://theharrispoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Harris-Interactive-Poll-
Research-Electing-judges-2008-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ8M-RAEE].  
201 Editorial, Mixed Signals: People Want to Elect Judges but Don’t Know Them, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at 2C. 
202 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (“Even if judges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the mere 
possibility that judges’ decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign 
contributors is likely to undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary.”); see also 
20/20 INSIGHT, NATIONAL REGISTERED VOTERS FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 2–4 (2011), 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NPJE2011poll_7FE4917006019.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/8YF6-WJ2Z] (finding that 83% of respondents believed that campaign contributions 
have a “great deal” or “some” effect on a judge’s decision); GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER 
RESEARCH & AMERICAN VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4 
(2001), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-polls-justice-stake [https://perma. 
cc/C5TR-XD25] (reporting result of national public opinion survey that 76% of registered 
voters believe that campaign contributions have “a great deal” or “some” influence on 
judicial decisions). 
203 For example, based on the comments to Rule 60.04(7) of the Wisconsin Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Wisconsin may choose to give more weight the public’s desire for an 
elected judiciary than the public’s fear that contributions taint judicial decisions. See WIS. 
SUP. CT. R. 60.04(7) (2019). 
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campaign contributions on public trust in the judiciary, together with the volume of 
pertinent public information, coalesce to produce a perfect platform for an 
experiment with a big data-based disqualification process. The use of big data to 
evaluate other circumstances that often form the basis of claims that a judge’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including friendships and other 





The appearance-based disqualification regime established in the 1972 ABA 
Code of Judicial Conduct and subsequently adopted by every federal and state 
jurisdiction is “crumbling.”204 The demise is not surprising. The ABA hoped to 
increase the reliability of disqualification decisions by instituting an objective test 
that empowered the fully informed, reasonable, layperson to decide whether the 
circumstances created the perception that a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably 
be questioned.” The 1972 ABA recusal test suffered from vagueness, the fiction that 
the average person was fully informed of the legal and factual minutia necessary to 
the disqualification decision, and the unrealistic assumption that the challenged 
judge could serve as both the object and interpreter of the appearance standard. 
These inherent defects prevent appearance-based recusal from achieving the ABA’s 
goals. If anything, the standard established in the 1972 Code made disqualification 
decisions less predictable and more arbitrary.205 
The band-aid approaches to fixing appearance-based disqualification—
including requiring written recusal decisions and assigning disqualification motions 
to independent judges—have failed because they do not address the underlying 
flaws of the doctrine. The preemptory removal of one trial judge at the request of a 
party might help solve part of the problem if automatic disqualification replaced the 
“might reasonably be questioned” standard. But the nineteen states permitting 
preemptory disqualification of trial judges have retained the “might reasonably be 
questioned” test, requiring judges to apply the impossible standard when 
independently evaluating their ethical obligations and when ruling on 
disqualification motions. Other reforms that directly address the shortcomings of 
appearance-based disqualification, such as empaneling a jury of “outsiders” to 
decide whether the circumstances create a perception of partiality, have not received 
serious consideration. 
Big data cures the major deficiencies plaguing appearance-based 
disqualification. Big data makes the fully informed, reasonable person a reality 
rather than an embarrassing fiction. It also adds a measure of objectivity to the 
                                                   
204 Geyh, supra note 16, at 675 (“I argue that the dominant regime that has structured 
judicial disqualification in the state and federal courts for nearly forty years . . . is crumbling, 
and the struggle for a successor regime has begun.”). 
205 See McKoski, supra note 18, at 433 (“The appearance-based disqualification scheme 
adopted by the ABA, Congress, and the states has failed on every level.”). 
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disqualification decision by replacing the challenged judge as the decision-maker or, 
alternatively, by supplying the challenged judge with an objective assessment of the 
circumstances. Best of all, the danger of erroneous decisions is absent when big data 
is used in disqualification decisions because a judge does not engage big data 
analytics unless the judge first determines that disqualification is not required. If big 
data analytics confirms the judge’s conclusion, the judge remains on the case. 
Assuming the big data decision is wrong, the parties suffer no change of position 
because even without analytics, the case would have stayed with the judge. On the 
other hand, if analytics disagrees with the judge and concludes that a reasonable 
question exists as to the judge’s impartiality, a new judge is assigned. Even if the 
big data analysis is wrong in determining that a new judge is necessary, the parties 
suffer no adverse consequences because a presumption of impartiality attaches to 
the successor judge. And, most importantly, in a disqualification regime controlled 
by appearances, the algorithmic-based outcome will appear objective to the public 
because it will be made by a truly fully informed outsider free from the judge’s 
biases and preconceptions. 
